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CATCHING SMOKE, NAILING JELL-O TO A
WALL: THE VANNA WHITE CASE AND THE
LIMITS OF CELEBRITY RIGHTS
David S. Welkowitz*
The suit brought by Vanna White against Samsung1 already has
achieved considerable notoriety, both in legal circles2 and in the
media.3 (And, incidentally, it resulted in a not inconsiderable
award of money to Vanna White.') With so much having been said
already, one hesitates to add to the pile. Yet, the case is a very
troubling one and should be commented upon for that reason. In
this essay, I propose to explore a few aspects of the case I find most
troubling and difficult. By the end, I hope to convince readers not
only that this case was decided incorrectly, but also that the court
overlooked important differences between this case and other so-
called "right of publicity" cases in which recovery was allowed.
* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. J.D., New York University School of Law, 1978;
A.B., Princeton University, 1975. I would like to thank my colleague, Tyler Ochoa, for his
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1583 (9th Cir.
1992), en banc reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
2 E.g., J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PmrVACY § 4.15[D] (1994
rev.); William M. Borchard, The Common Law Right of Publicity is Going Wrong in the
United States: Waits v. Frito-Lay and White v. Samsung Electronics, 6 ENT. L. REV. 208
(1992); Patricia B. Frank, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.: The Right of
Publicity Spins its Wheels, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115 (1994); Gretchen A. Pemberton, The
Parodist's Claim to Fame: A Parody Exception to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 97 (1993); Alexander C. Giftos, Comment, The Common Law Right of Publicity and
Commercial Appropriation of Celebrity Identity: 'A Whole New Wardrobe for Vanna", 38 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 983 (1994); John F. Hyland and Ted C. Lindquist III, Note, White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc.: The Wheels of Justice Take an Unfortunate Turn, 23 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 299 (1993).
3 E.g., Greg Braxton, Vanna White Ruling Has Impressionists Spinning, LA. TIMES, June
4, 1993, at F2; Aaron Epstein, Cashing in on Celebrities Courts Trouble, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, September 19, 1993, at IF; Lois Romano, The Reliable Source, WASH. POST, June 2,
1993, at B3; Neal Rubin, Neal Rubin's Names and Faces, DETROIT FREE PRESS, January 21,
1994, at 10F. See also White, 989 F.2d at 1517 n.23 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (citing several articles).
4 Shauna Snow, Morning Report, L.A. TIMES, January 21, 1994, at F2 (reporting jury
verdict for $403,000 in favor of Vanna White).
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The dispute arose from an advertising campaign for videocassette
recorders on behalf of Samsung, a manufacturer of consumer
electronic products. The point of the advertising in question was
to emphasize that Samsung intended to be a leader in the consum-
er electronics market for many years to come. Its advertisements
featured whimsical (and often farcical) looks at future events,
indicating that Samsung still would be around when those events
took place. For example, one advertisement showed commentator
Morton Downey, Jr. with the caption "Presidential candidate. 2008
A.D."5 The advertisement that induced the lawsuit featured a
robot with a blond wig and gown standing next to a set of capital
letters like those on the Wheel of Fortune game show. The caption
read "Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D."' Vanna White,
hostess of Wheel of Fortune, sued Samsung, claiming that the
advertisement infringed her commercial right of publicity.
Although the advertisement used a robot and did not claim that she
was a Samsung product endorser, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld White's right to sue7 and, ultimately, a jury
awarded her $403,000.8
This essay will focus on the kind of use made by Samsung of the
"identity" of Vanna White and how it differs from other cases. By
permitting Vanna White to recover, the court overlooked necessary
limits on the right of publicity. Part I of the essay will focus on a
specific problem with White-what I call the "metaphoric use" of
celebrity. It will be argued that White gives protection to a
celebrity far beyond what ought to be the core concerns of any right
of publicity. The primary problem with such protection is the
chameleon-like quality of the right at issue. At various times, it
looks and is treated like different types of intellectual property.
But, as the right has expanded, it has taken on new shapes that
transcend limits on traditional intellectual property rights. When
deciding whether to grant a right to the celebrity in a particular
case, one appropriately may ask whether this transcendence is
5 White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
' Id. The robot clearly was not intended to be a recognizable human being. The only
human features were the blond wig, dress and jewelry. See id. at 1396-97 (holding it was
not "likeness" of Vanna White).
Id. at 1402.
s Snow, supra note 4, at F2.
[Vol. 3:67
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THE VANNA WHITE CASE
justified or whether more traditional limits on intellectual property
rights should cabin this right as well.
Part II will expand the discussion to the larger issue of the
boundaries of the right of publicity, again focusing on the bound-
aries (or lack thereof) implicit in the White case. The White
decision, and many others, give broad protection to celebrities
against any use of their celebrity "status" or "identity," if the use
is labeled "commercial." But "commerciality" is a poor proxy for a
wrongful appropriation.
We will begin with some background, followed by a focused look
at White and the specific use of Vanna White's "identity" in that
case.
PART I: CELEBRITY AND METAPHOR
A. THE EXPANDING RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
1. In the Beginning. An offshoot of the right of privacy-or,
more colloquially, the "right to be left alone--the right of publicity
as a separate doctrine generally is considered to have emerged in
a 1953 Second Circuit decision, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.9 In that case, Judge Frank found an exclusive,
assignable right of commercial exploitation of one's name or
likeness.' ° He used the term "right of publicity" to distinguish
this commercial right from the privacy concept of protection from
9 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See McCARTHY, supra note 2,
§ 1.7.
'0 Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868. Years earlier, in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), the Georgia Supreme Court granted a right of action to a person
whose picture had been used without his permission in an advertisement for an insurance
company. Id. at 79. The advertisement also contained a false endorsement by the plaintiff,
Paolo Pavesich. Id. at 81. But Mr. Pavesich was not a celebrity and his suit was grounded
in the violation of his dignity interest, rather than a misappropriation of his commercial
rights. Thus, the case rested on privacy grounds, rather than a right of publicity. (Moreover,
the court expressly declined to decide whether a celebrity, a public character, would have any
less right to an injunction in similar circumstances. Id. at 79-80.) However, one can see that
the right of privacy and right of publicity are not entirely distinct. See also Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Eq. 1907) (injunction granted to Thomas Edison
against company using his name without permission and false endorsement). By contrast,
New York's courts resisted giving plaintiffs this same claim. Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
1995]
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an invasion of one's personal enclave of solitude." Two influential
law review articles followed the Haelan decision, one by Melville
Nimmer 12 and one by William Prosser. i" Prosser's article recog-
nized that the appropriation tort at the root of the right of publicity
fundamentally differed from the conventional privacy torts. 4
However, he still categorized it as a form of "privacy" tort, rather
than as a separate and distinct claim.'5 Shortly after the Haelan
decision, Nimmer argued that limitations on the privacy tort and
other available torts made them unsuitable vehicles for protecting
rights of publicity.'6 He asserted that the right of publicity should
be treated "as a property (not a personal) right."17 His rationale
for such protection was that publicity values normally are the
result of expenditures of time and effort by the celebrity and the
celebrity should be "entitled to the fruit of his labors, unless there
are important countervailing policy considerations.""
From these roots a rather large tree has grown. No consistent
doctrine has evolved that is followed in substantially all states. 9
However, many states have recognized some form of a right to
control the commercial exploitation of one's name or likeness.2 °
Most of the states have acceded to this through common law
" Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868.
12 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
13 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
14 Prosser divided privacy into four categories: intrusion into one's "solitude," disclosure
of embarrassing facts, false light, and appropriation. Id. at 389. See also MCCARTHY, supra
note 2, § 1.5.
1 A California state court case from 1983, Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d
409, (1983), used the Prosser categories to describe a right of publicity claim. Id. at 416.
However, the court also referred to the claim as one for infringement of a "right of publicity."
Id. at 413. See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979) (also using
Prosser's four categories).
16 Nimmer, supra note 12, passim.
17 Id. at 216.
'8 Id. For a critical view of this argument, see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of
Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 182-96 (1993)
[hereinafter Madow, Publicity Rights].
19 There is no federal right of publicity as such. However, under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act (the federal trademark statute), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994), a celebrity can bring a claim
if he or she believes that an advertiser falsely implied that the celebrity has endorsed a
particular product. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d, 1395, 1399-1401 (9th
Cir. 1992) (discussing § 43(a) claim), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
20 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6.1[B] (24 states).
[Vol. 3:67
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development; 21 ironically, New York, whose law the Haelan court
ostensibly interpreted, recognizes only a statutory right.22 The
U.S. Supreme Court recognized the existence of right of publicity
claims in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.' Zacchini
examined the extent to which the First Amendment limited the
right of publicity granted under state law; it did not create an
independent federal law of publicity rights. The Zacchini decision
has been credited, however, with spurring interest in using the
right of publicity by attorneys and judges.24 The recent expansion
of this right to the point reached in the White decision prompts this
discussion.
2. Recent Expansion.25 White is one of a series of recent Ninth
Circuit decisions expanding the rights of celebrities to control their
images.26  In Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,27 the
plaintiff, a famous race car driver, claimed that a cigarette ad using
a car identifiable as one usually driven by plaintiff infringed his
right of publicity. With little discussion, the Ninth Circuit agreed
that California law "afford[ed] legal protection to an individual's
21 id.
' Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984). At least
twelve other states have statutes protecting rights of publicity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, statutory note at 536 (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Not all
are as restrictive as New York's statute. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6.2.
23 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
24 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.10[B], at 1-44.
' The discussion below of recent cases does not purport to be comprehensive. Its focus
is on Ninth Circuit cases and a few cases from other courts demonstrating the potential
breadth of the right of publicity. For a lengthier discussion of recent cases, see MCCARTHY,
supra note 2, passim; Giftos, supra note 2, at 983, 993-1001.
" E.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding singer's right
to sue), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993) 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 12; Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding car driver's right to sue); cf Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971) (denying right of
publicity claim by Nancy Sinatra); Nurmi v. Petersen, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (denying right of publicity claim under California law). This expansion is not confined
to the Ninth Circuit. E.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1586 (3d
Cir. 1994) (finding right of publicity in character applying New Jersey law); Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding
no use of name or likeness needed applying Michigan law); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.
Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (using names and statistics of ball players in board game).
2'7 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
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proprietary interest in his own identity."" Finding that the
advertisement uniquely identified plaintiff, the court held that
plaintiff could proceed with his claim.29 The court at least hinted
broadly that the heart of the claim was false endorsement; the
court noted that "part of [plaintiffs] income" derived from endorse-
ments30 and that plaintiff submitted affidavits averring an
assumption that plaintiff endorsed defendant's products.3
Motschenbacher provided the springboard for the decision in
Midler v. Ford Motor Co. ,32 where the court upheld singer/actress
Bette Midler's right to sue Ford. Ford had hired a singer to imitate
Midler's voice, and to sing in a Ford radio commercial a song
known to be sung by Midler.3 3  The court relied heavily on its
Motschenbacher opinion in concluding that Ford unlawfully
appropriated "part of [Midler's] identity."34  Not surprisingly,
Midler was the primary authority for a case that immediately
followed White, Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.35 In Waits, Frito-Lay
hired a singer to imitate the voice and "style" of Tom Waits, but not
to sing a song connected with Waits. 3  Despite this differ-
ence-and its expansion of the celebrity's right to control his or her
28 Id. at 825. The court cited a string of California cases in footnotes, id. at 823 n.6, 824
nn.7 & 8, but did not discuss any of them in the body of the opinion. Footnotes 7 and 8 very
briefly discussed two opinions; footnote 6 was simply a string cite without meaningful
discussion.
29 Id. at 826.
30 Id. at 822.
s Id.
32 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992).
33 See id. at 461 (discussing hiring of "sound alike" to sing "Do You Want to Dance").
Ford originally tried to hire Midler herself but she turned down Ford's offer. Id.
"Id. at 464. Beyond saying that one who appropriates a well known singer's voice to sell
a product is liable in tort, the court did not identify the true "wrong" committed. Id. at 463.
Not all jurisdictions recognize a claim for voice imitation. See Maxwell v. N.W. Ayer, Inc.,
605 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (no such claim under New York law). In an
earlier case, Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 819
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), a federal court in New York held that a commercial's imitation of an
actress's voice as she portrayed a television character was not actionable. Id. at 347 (Shirley
Booth complaining of commercial imitating her voice as "Hazel").
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voice-the court found Midler to be controlling.37
Thus, the broadly defined right given to Vanna White can be seen
as a link in a chain of continually more expansive decisions by the
Ninth Circuit in this area. As in White, these cases did not involve
the use of an actual picture, likeness, accessory (car) or voice of the
celebrity. Nevertheless, because advertisers led the public to
believe that the celebrity actually was the source, the court held
that a claim could be brought. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit panels
continually wrote of protecting a celebrity's "identity," which is a
more amorphous (and potentially more expansive) concept than
name or likeness.
The expansion of rights of publicity under state law is not limited
to the Ninth Circuit. 8 In Uhlaender v. Henricksen,9 the court
granted a judgment against the manufacturer of a baseball
simulation game. The game used the names, team affiliations and
statistics of actual players (which are matters of public record 0 ).
The court described the protection offered celebrities in broad
terms: "Defendants have violated plaintiffs' rights by the unautho-
rized appropriation of their names and statistics for commercial
use."" It apparently assumed that a "commercial use" constituted
a per se wrongful appropriation.
In McFarland v. Miller,"2 the actor who once played the role of
"' Id. at 1102. Midler focused on the imitator singing a "trademark" song of Bette Midler.
In Waits, the imitation was of the singer's voice and "style," with all of the lack of definition
inherent in that term, as aspects of a claim. Copying style alone, however, apparently would
not have been sufficient. See id. at 1100-01 & n.2. See also Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (musical "style" of Guy Lombardo
appropriated). Cf. Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting protection under § 43(a) of Lanham Act
to artistic style). On the other hand, Waits contained the undercurrents of a false
endorsement through the use of a good imitation of his voice alone. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103
(friends of Waits thought he was endorsing Frito-Lay products).
' Or, as Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit so colorfully described it, the "Court of
Appeals for the Hollywood Circuit." White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521
(9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2443 (1993).
316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
o See id. at 1279 (defendant asserted statistics are published regularly in newspaper).
41 1d. at 1283. See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1967) (use of names and biographical data of famous golfers in golf game violated
rights of publicity).
42 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
1995]
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"Spanky" in the "Our Gang" movie series and in the "Little Rascals"
television series sued the owner of a restaurant named "Spanky
McFarland's." The court ruled that an "actor [may] obtain[] an
interest [in his stage or screen persona] which gives him standing
to prevent mere interlopers from using it without authority."4
Thus, the court allowed one's stage "identity" to become the basis
of a publicity right.4'
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.4" also extended
the right of publicity beyond simple name or likeness appropriation.
A portable toilet manufacturer marketed a product called "Here's
Johnny," an obvious play on the "Tonight Show" host introduc-
tion.47 The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint, finding a claim under Michigan law for violation
of Carson's right of publicity. Notably, the appellate court upheld
the lower court's determination that there was no likelihood of
consumer confusion.48 Moreover, the court rejected a claim based
on a right of privacy for embarrassment. 4'9 Nevertheless, it found
a right to recover under the right of publicity. The court stated its
rationale as follows: "It is our view that, under the existing
authorities, a celebrity's legal right of publicity is invaded whenever
his identity is intentionally appropriated for commercial purpos-
es."5°  The ambiguous phrase "appropriated for commercial
purposes" is subject to many interpretations, as is evident by the
result in White.
The focal point of the court's discussion of the right of publicity
in White was whether a celebrity could recover without showing
4Id. at 916.
4Id. at 920 (footnote omitted). Cf Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 432 (Cal.
1979) (Mosk, J., concurring) (expressing doubt about publicity right in character not of actor's
own creation).
The court also held that New Jersey law would permit that right to survive the death
of the plaintiff. McFarland, 14 F.3d at 917-18.
4698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
47 "Here's Johnny!" was the standard introduction of Johnny Carson by Ed McMahon on
the Tonight Show. Id. at 832. To make the connection more obvious, the product also was
denoted the "World's Foremost Commodian." Id. at 833.
4Id. at 833-34. This is a necessary predicate for claims of false endorsement under §
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
49 Carson, 698 F.2d at 834.
50 Id. at 837.
[Vol. 3:67
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that her "name or likeness" had been appropriated.51 The court
cited to its earlier decisions in Midler and Motschenbacher as
examples of cases where right of publicity claims were upheld,
though the plaintiffs name or likeness had not been appropriated
directly.52 The court concluded that the linchpin of the claim was
the appropriation of the "celebrity['s] identity value," 3 no matter
how that identity is evoked. Where White first departs from the
earlier Ninth Circuit decisions is in the definition of identity.
Although the advertisement used a robot in a blond wig and
evening gown, not a recognizable human being, the court still found
an appropriation of identity. All that was necessary was that the
advertisement taken as a whole, in this case including the fact that
the robot was in a Wheel of Fortune set, evoked the image of
Vanna White.5 4  Apparently, the court found the following a
sufficient justification for its result:
Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by
those who have achieved celebrity value to exploit it
for profit. The law protects the celebrity's sole right
to exploit this value [i.e., the value of being a celebri-
ty] whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out
of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination there-
of.5
5
Once the court determined that a right of publicity claim could be
founded on something other than appropriation of one's name or
likeness, it engaged in little discussion of any other limits inherent
in such a claim. The court brushed aside a First Amendment
"1 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1992).
52 Id, at 1397-98. The court also cited Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698
F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), as an example of a right of publicity claim without a name or
likeness appropriation. White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
53 White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
"The court gave an example that it thought was analogous-an advertisement using a
recognizably male robot with "an African-American complexion,... a bald head ... wearing
black hightop Air Jordan basketball sneakers, and a red basketball uniform with black trim,
baggy shorts, and the number 23.' Id. at 1399. The court asserted that the obvious
association with Michael Jordan was the same sort of association evoked by the Samsung
ad. Id. This analogy is discussed further, infra text, at notes 63-68.
5White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
1995]
9
Welkowitz: Catching Smoke, Nailing JELL-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case an
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1995
76 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 3:67
defense based on the advertisement as a parody. The court's one
paragraph discussion of this issue was summed up this way:
"Defendant's parody arguments are better addressed to non-
commercial parodies. The difference between a 'parody' and a
'knock-off is the difference between fun and profit.""
B. VANNA WHITE AS A METAPHOR
In White, the court regarded Midler and Motschenbacher as
important precedents for its decision. However, the court over-
looked two critical distinctions between Vanna White's claim and
those made in Midler and Motschenbacher. First, in the two earlier
cases there was an element of deception. In Motschenbacher, the
defendant apparently tried to imitate a race car known to be driven
by the plaintiff. In Midler, the defendant set out to convince the
public that Bette Midler herself was singing in the background.57
No such deception existed in White. Samsung was not trying to fool
anyone into believing that the robot actually was Vanna White (and
it is difficult to imagine even the most gullible person being so
deceived, given the nature of the robot).58 The court should have
been aware that "calling to mind" a celebrity is different than
making one believe that it is the celebrity, or that there is a
connection between the ad and the celebrity.59
5Id. at 1401 (footnote omitted).
" Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988). Waits, a subsequent case,
contained the same element of deception. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th
Cir. 1992) (describing wrong as "a deliberate imitation of Waits' voice"), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1047 (1993).
The robot is pictured in an Appendix to Judge Kozinski's opinion, dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc. White, 989 F.2d at 1523. It is true that the Ninth Circuit found
that White stated a claim for false endorsement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 971 F.2d
at 1399-1401. However, that ruling most charitably can be described as strained. The court
cited no evidence in the record indicating either an intent to confuse on the part of Samsung
or a likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers (such as a survey). Id. at 1400-1401.
Rather, the court stressed that other celebrities whose likenesses were used in the
advertisement series were paid for this use-a fact of which consumers would likely have
been aware. Id. at 1401. To allow an inference of confusion on such meager evidence implies
that the court simply thought it was unfair that some celebrities were paid while Vanna
White was not.
"' The Ninth Circuit upheld, however, White's right to a trial on her claim for false
endorsement. Id. at 1399-1401. See supra note 58 (discussing court's analysis of false
endorsement).
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The second, and crucial point, however, is that the use made by
Samsung of White's identity differed markedly from the use of
celebrity identities in other cases. Typically, when an advertiser
uses a celebrity (or a deceptively similar imitation) in an advertise-
ment, it has one overriding reason in mind-the celebrity projects
an image, or "star quality," that embodies certain qualities with
which the advertiser wishes to associate its products.' These
qualities need not be explicit. In Midler, the imagery of Bette
Midler may have combined dynamism and nostalgia."' In Motsch-
enbacher, no doubt the imagery of a race car driver fit the outdoor,
exciting image desired by a cigarette company. In McFarland,
though the association was with a character, not the actual person,
evidently the defendant restaurant wanted to use the positive
nostalgia of the "Our Gang" characters as part of a movie star motif
for the establishment. 2
This associational underpinning is why the hypothetical con-
tained in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in White fails as an analogy
to the actual facts. The court asked us to "[c]onsider a hypothetical
advertisement ... run on television during professional basketball
games" using a robot recognizable as representing Michael
Jordan.63 If a Converse or Reebok sneaker advertisement used
such a robot simply to compare their shoes with Nike's Air Jordans,
or perhaps to deceive consumers into believing that Jordan now
endorsed another brand of sneakers, then the concern for infringe-
ment of Jordan's right of publicity would be understandable. 6'
Moreover, we may logically assume the hypothesized advertisement
was not simply a somewhat disparaging parody of Michael Jordan.
o See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994) (suggesting people link
celebrities with products they endorse). I
61 See Midler, 849 F.2d at 461 (noting Midler had been termed "dynamic" personality and
point of advertising was to "make an emotional connection with Yuppies, bringing back
memories of when they were in college").
' According to the court, the restaurant contained "over 1,000 photos of movie characters,
including some of the 'Little Rascals' [and t]he restaurant also displays two [very large]
murals of 'Our Gang.'" McFarland, 14 F.3d at 916.
63 White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
6 That the court assumed the hypothetical was like an endorsement is indicated in the
paragraph just preceding the example. There the court wrote of advertisers "us[ing]
celebrities to promote their products." Id. Moreover, Michael Jordan's known commercial
ties to various companies would reinforce the endorsement model of the robot advertisement.
1995]
11
Welkowitz: Catching Smoke, Nailing JELL-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case an
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1995
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
Rather, it seems that the hypothetical advertiser wanted to obtain
some of the star quality associated with Jordan for its products.
Furthermore, Michael Jordan's commercial association with a major
manufacturer of basketball sneakers, Nike, is widely known. This
fact reinforces the notion that the hypothesized advertiser is
seeking to use Jordan's star quality in association with its products
(if not a false representation of an endorsement).65
In analogizing this hypothetical to White's case, the court omitted
critical information-for what purpose is the robot being used? The
hypothetical seemed to rely on the associative star quality of
Michael Jordan. But that is precisely the distinction from White;
there, the advertiser, Samsung, was not seeking to use the positive
star quality values of Vanna White to sell its products. First of all,
Samsung was not using Vanna White, the person, at all. It was
using the role she plays on television-hostess and letter turner."
This use does not even rise to the level of a recognizable "character"
as was the case in McFarland.67 Second, Samsung was using the
role as a metaphor for television in the future.68 It was, in effect,
saying "This robot is the future Vanna White." Thus, the purpose
was not to associate the qualities of Vanna White with the qualities
of Samsung VCRs. Far from it-the purpose was to make a
statement, and the role Vanna White plays was a convenient
" Professor Madow also uses a hypothetical Michael Jordan advertisement in his article.
Madow, Publicity Rights, supra note 18, at 234-35. His example-a truthful advertisement
by a sneaker company whose sneakers Jordan wore in college-raises a difficult issue. It
appears that Jordan's star quality is being used by the hypothetical advertiser. Yet, as
Professor Madow notes, permitting a right of publicity claim in this instance suppresses
truthful information. Id. Although star quality may be a useful starting point for a court,
it is not necessarily the only limit to be considered.
See White, 989 F.2d at 1515 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
("The panel is' giving White an exclusive right not in what she looks like or who she is, but
in what she does for a living.").
6 It is unclear that California law would permit her to recover even if this were a
.character," since she did not create the character herself. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., concurring) (actor did not create character of Dracula).
On the other hand, given the Wheel of Fortune setting, the Samsung advertisement
inevitably brings to mind Vanna White. White, 989 F.2d at 1515 (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
" It is important to understand that it was not Ms. White per se that was being
portrayed but the character that she plays on the television show. White, 971 F.2d at 1404
(Alarcon, J., dissenting in part); White, 989 F.2d at 1515 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
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shorthand for that statement.
Rather than the hypothetical put forth by the Ninth Circuit,
another hypothetical seems a more apt comparison to the case.
Consider the following radio commercial for Samsung products. "In
the future, when the Pentium computer becomes the Twentium,
when bacon and eggs are health food, when Vanna White has been
replaced by a robot, this same Samsung VCR will still be in use!"
Would that commercial give rise to a right of publicity claim? 9 I
submit that it should not be the basis for imposing any liability.7"
And the thrust of the hypothetical radio commercial is the same as
the actual Samsung advertisement; Samsung will be a leader in the
future consumer electronics industry. Though the example does not
use a series of famous people, it uses the same symbolism, namely,
humorous looks at the future. Most important, Vanna White's
place in the advertisement is the same as before-a symbol of a job
that could be replaced by a machine. No doubt Vanna White was
not flattered by the symbolism. However, there is no obvious
reason to allow celebrities to exercise complete "spin" control over
the way they are perceived by the public.
Thus, the critical difference between White and other cases
permitting a right of publicity claim is that Vanna White was no
more than a literary reference in Samsung's advertisement.
Samsung did not exploit her image to gain some positive associa-
tional value. Not all uses of a celebrity constitute wrongful
appropriation. Only those uses that exploit the core commercial
value of the celebrity, the star quality, should be questioned. A
commercial use must be distinguished from a use of the commercial
value of the celebrity. An advertisement-a commercial use-does
not automatically constitute a use of the commercial value of the
celebrity identity. When the advertisement seeks to associate the
positive values of the celebrity with the product, a use of the
69 It is hard to imagine even the panel that decided White being willing to assume an
implied endorsement in such a situation. True enough, that panel permitted a claim of
implied endorsement by Vanna White to go forward. White, 971 F.2d at 1400-01. However,
the hypothetical posed here seems somewhat removed from the facts of White regarding
possible consumer confusion. Thus, a claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the federal
trademark statute, should fail.
70 It seems equally ridiculous to posit a successful suit by Intel for trademark
infringement for using its "Pentium" mark.
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commercial value may be occurring. But where the celebrity is
merely a point of reference, the celebrity's commercial value is not
being used.
Put another way, it may be that Bette Midler "owns" the right to
use her voice as a sales mechanism. Parts of a celebrity's image,
however, must be shared with the public. In Vanna White's case,
the part of her image that connoted a robotic job is a public image
that does not belong to her. Thus, Samsung had a right to use that
public domain portion of her image, even in a commercial setting.
The Ninth Circuit did not have to look far afield to find cases
making a very similar point. A line of cases in trademark law
recognizes the need to give even non-competitors a right to use a
trademark to make a linguistic point.71 A good example is a case
decided by the Ninth Circuit at almost the same time it decided the
White case. In New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing,
Inc. ,72 two tabloid newspapers promoted telephone polls about the
singing group New Kids on the Block.73 Both newspaper polls
referred to the "New Kids on the Block," and both polls employed
900 numbers, which impose a charge on the caller.74 The "New
Kids" group sued the newspapers and claimed an infringement of
its name. The Ninth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment
for the newspapers and refused to recognize liability for such a use.
The court found a "nominative fair use defense" to be applicable
where one uses a trademark to describe a product or service "not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark."7" The court
"' Use of trademarks in truthful comparative advertising is widely recognized as
legitimate. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 388 (9th Cir. 1968)
(maker of fragrance imitating "Chanel No. 5" may use Chanel mark in comparative
advertising); see Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 73 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133
(1947) (permitting second hand dealer in spark plugs to sell reconditioned "Champion" spark
plugs without removing original trademark as long as they are clearly marked as
reconditioned).
72 971 F.2d 302, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (9th Cir. 1992).
7 A USA Today poll "asked 'Who's the best on the block?' " and a Star poll queried "Now
which kid is the sexiest?" and "Which of the New Kids on the Block would you most like to
move next door?" Id. at 304.
7 4 Id. USA Today promised its profits from the poll to charity; the Star made no similar
promise. Id.
" Id. at 308. Judge Kozinski, author of the New Kids opinion, noted its omission from
the White panel's analysis. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 & n.20
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of
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noted that "it is often virtually impossible to refer to a particular
product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or
any other such purpose without using the mark."7 6
Another such case is WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Assn,77 which
was cited in New Kids. The Boston Athletic Association ("BAA"),
which runs the Boston Marathon, sued a television station that
intended to broadcast the event (but not under license by the BAA)
and promoted its broadcast using the term "Boston Marathon."
However, the First Circuit found no evidence that the public would
be confused in any way78 by the station's use of the Boston
Marathon mark. In a revealing passage, the court stated:
As a general matter, the law sometimes protects
investors from the "free riding" of others; and some-
times it does not .... Just how, when and where the
law should protect investments in "intangible"
benefits or goods is a matter that legislators typically
debate, embodying the results in specific statutes, or
that common law courts, carefully weighing relevant
competing interests, gradually work out over time.79
How would one distinguish these cases from White? Apart from
the fact that they involved trademarks, not rights of publicity, any
distinctions would have to turn narrowly on the facts of White. In
particular, the White court cited these facts as important: (i) the
use in a concerted campaign, both print and television; and (ii)
Samsung had paid other celebrities appearing in these advertise-
ments for the use of their names or likenesses.80 Neither distinc-
tion is convincing. The first does not alter the nature of the use in
both cases as a metaphor or shorthand reference. The second is not
one about which the audience would be knowledgeable."' More-
over, using payment of others as decisive begs the essential
rehearing en banc).76 New Kids, at 306.
77 926 F.2d 42, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1688 (1st Cir. 1991).
78 Such as by thinking that this television station was the "official" station. Id. at 45.
79 Id. (third emphasis added).
so White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
s' Nor is it likely that the audience would care, given the parody-like nature of the ads.
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question-is there anything here to be appropriated?
The Ninth Circuit majority in White did not refer to either New
Kids or Boston Athletic. Their absence suggests that the court
viewed these cases through a very different lens, one where the
crux of the case is the context of the use made of the celebrity
identity-i.e., whether the use is deemed commercial or non-
commercial. But if the nature of the claim is for wrongful appropri-
ation or misappropriation then it should make a difference how the
celebrity identity is used. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit focused
on the fact of use, as if that were conclusive. In doing so, it
confused the means of appropriation-i.e., whether an actual
likeness was used-with the purpose of the appropriation.
The New Kids and Boston Athletic cases recognize principles that
ought to apply to publicity rights as well. First, they recognize that
trademarks convey information beyond simply the source of goods
or services. Second, corresponding to this observation, they
recognize that one who does not use the mark as an indication of
source, but as a description of the services offered by the person,
should not be liable for infringement. 2 Similarly, at least regard-
ing advertisements, celebrity rights should not extend to circum-
stances where the advertiser is not using the associative value of
the celebrity's image (the star quality) but instead is using the
image to make a linguistic point.
83
A second line of trademark cases may also be relevant to this
discussion. This set of cases determines whether a trademark has
become the generic term or symbol for a product or service and
thus has lost its protection as a trademark. In other words, generic
marks are those that have become the primary means of referring
to an object, rather than a unique source of the object.8" In Vanna
White's case, she was a means of referring to a concept; she stood
85Along these same lines, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition states that the
doctrine of trademark dilution should not apply where the alleged diluting use is not a
trademark use of the original mark (that is, where it is not being used to indicate the source
of the products or services of the allegedly diluting user). RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, §
25(2) and cmt. c. at 268.
' My limitation to advertisements is meant to limit the focus to trademark-like uses of
celebrity images. As discussed below, other uses, resembling copyright uses, would not
necessarily fit this framework.
s' See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 12.01[1].
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for the concept. In a way, she was the generic description of a
particular idea.
Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss propounds a more elaborate and
pertinent discussion of marks as generic expressions of ideas.8 5
Briefly stated, she argues that trademarks have an expressive
linguistic component transcending their value as source identifiers.
This value, she states, should not be monopolized by the trademark
owner, but should be available to the public.8 6 She points out that
our language is peppered with phrases derived from trademarks,
for example "Barbie doll" and "Pepsi Generation."87 Our language
is richer for these expressions and the public is the loser if we give
total control over such expressions to the trademark owner.
A similar argument could be made for using celebrity images as
a form of expression.' Celebrities often become metaphors for
concepts. "Acting like Clint Eastwood" no doubt conveys an idea to
many people.8 9 Similarly, Vanna White, in her role on "Wheel of
Fortune," conjures up a variety of images. These images are useful
shorthands for longer expressions. Thus, when Samsung used a
robot in a role recognizable as a substitute for Vanna White, it used
that imagery, that shorthand expression, represented by Vanna
White. Just as Vanna White cannot control the connotations-good
and bad-that surround her image, she should not be able to
control the use of those connotations, except perhaps to the extent
that they are used deceptively or fall within the realm of defama-
tion.90 To do otherwise grants her a right not grounded in any
public interest. To the extent that Samsung's advertisement placed
" Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity].
8 Id. at 408-09. I should note that this very brief synopsis does not do justice to
Professor Dreyfuss' very interesting discussion.
87 Id. at 397.
s See id. at 400 n.16.
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 n.6 (9th Cir.) (Kosinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing examples of trademarked items used in
popular culture), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). Among the examples cited in the
footnote is a song by Mel Tillis entitled "Coca-Cola Cowboy," with lyrics that include "You've
got an Eastwood smile and Robert Redford hair." Id.
9o Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 25(2) (limiting liability for trademark dilution in
many cases to circumstances amounting to defamation, invasion of privacy, or injurious
falsehood); see also David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV.
531, 557-58 (1991) (discussing trademark tarnishment).
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her image in a bad light (by implying that a robot could do her job),
the imagery was effective because of an existing connotation
connected with her image. Though celebrities work hard to
maintain an image that they desire, in truth their images represent
public perceptions. There is no discernable public interest in
permitting those perceptions to be shaped solely by the celebrity.
Absent a malicious motivation, a public figure is partly subject to
the imagery created by others.
If we allow unlimited control of metaphorical uses of celebrity
identities by those celebrities, we surely are limiting our variety of
permissible expression with little, if any, noticeable gain to the
public. Even the conventionally cited rationales for celebrity
control-promotion of celebrity activity, granting the celebrity the
fruits of her labor, or unjust enrichment ("reaping where one has
not sown")-do not ineluctably support such control. A metaphoric
use is not a pure appropriation of the celebrity's identity; the
second user has added value to the celebrity symbol by using it in
a new way.9 Thus, any enrichment to the second user is hardly
unjust and is not the result of the celebrity's labor.92 And it is
hard to imagine that failing to allow such complete control over this
use of a celebrity identity would measurably affect the willingness
of people to engage in celebrity activity.93
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's failure to examine carefully the purpose
for which the celebrity was invoked inevitably led to an overbroad
concept of the property right of celebrity. Samsung's use of White's
identity was not unfair or exploitative. Instead, it was a rational
linguistic use that accurately conveyed meaning to Samsung's
audience. That meaning transcended any star quality of Vanna
White, which should be the heart of the court's protective instincts.
" See, e.g., Madow, Publicity Rights, supra note 18 at 204-05 (discussing humorous and
creative appropriations of celebrity names and likenesses).
2 The "added value" notion, which is discussed extensively by Professor Madow in his
article, shows that absolute control in one person may prevent the adding of value by others.
Id. at 199-205. This does not seem to serve a public purpose.
9 3 ld. at 208-15.
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PART II: THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS
A. RIGHTS AND BOUNDARIES
The preceding discussion focused on a single problem with
White-that there was no misuse of Ms. White's "identity" at all.
Samsung simply evoked her image as a metaphor, not to gain
whatever star quality associations that her image might carry.
However, White is symptomatic of a larger problem with the right
of publicity: it has become a right virtually without limits. To this
problem we now turn.
The majority in White concluded that California law permitted a
suit where the "defendant has in fact appropriated plaintiff's
identity."94 The court went on to say that "[i]t is not important
how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiffs identity, but
whether the defendant has done so."' And it said that the "sole
right" to use commercially the celebrity's "identity" belongs to the
celebrity. 96 Having labeled Samsung's use commercial, the court
dispensed with the most obvious limit available, the First Amend-
ment.97  Thus, White gives the celebrity a preemptive right not
limited either by the means the defendant used or by ordinary
needs of expression (except for some uses in media traditionally
protected by the First Amendment)."
1. Why Not a Broad Property Right? Proponents of broad rights
of publicity put forth an appealing argument in favor of such rights
that may explain the lack of a limiting principle. They argue the
celebrity possesses something-a name, voice, face, or star quali-
ty-for which a commercial user is prepared to pay." Therefore,
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. (emphasis in original).
gId. at 1399.
97 id. at 1401.
" E.g., Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (play about life of
Janis Joplin); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1967)
(game using actual biographical data of famous golfers not protected); Marcinkus v. NAL
Publishing, Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (print advertising for book separated
from book itself for right of publicity purposes).
"E.g., Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has
Gone; Brand Equity as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
219, 236 (1994) (quoting Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1213, 213
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it is only right that the celebrity be permitted to reap the benefits
of possessing this asset. In other words, the law should not
interfere with an economically sound, bargained-for exchange that
otherwise would occur only by forcing the celebrity to give that
asset away for free.'00
That argument, however, is flawed because it depends on the
assumptions that a fair or proper system must recognize the
desirability of bargained-for exchanges and that it must favor such
exchanges. It is almost a natural law conception that the natural
order of things must of course favor encouragement of these
bargaining exchanges. Indeed, it also resembles a "takings"
argument-to interfere with the celebrity's right to sell his or her
fame is to destroy a recognizable property right.'0 ' But one
certainly can imagine a rational system of law in which such rights
are not recognized.0 2 The Framers of the Constitution were not
shy about protecting property and expectations. One of the few
explicit limits on state authority in the original document is the
Contracts Clause, which prevents states from interfering with
contractual expectations.' 3  The Fifth Amendment prohibits
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 813 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977))). See McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.3. Professor Dreyfuss calls this
the "if value, then right" theory. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 85, at 405.
" Intuitively, this appears strikingly similar to two other arguments in favor of publicity
rights: the "reap/sow" argument (one should not reap where she has not sown), International
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918), and the "fruits of one's labor"
argument. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing need for restrictive control); cf Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 352-54, 358, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991) (rejecting "sweat of the brow"
theory of recovery under copyright law for compilations of otherwise uncopyrightable facts).
However, the latter argument depends on the celebrity having done something to earn the
property. The former does not depend on this, but it seems implicit that the legitimate
"reaper" (i.e., the celebrity) should have "sown" something herself. In the bargaining model,
the celebrity status could have come by accident without affecting the appeal of the
argument.
101 Of course, here the taking is by a private party, not the government, so the analogy
is not completely accurate.
102 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (suggesting panel majority begged question
whether White should have right to identity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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taking private property for public use without compensation. 0 4
Yet, as Professor Madow has shown, eighteenth century common
law did not protect a celebrity's image from appropriation.0 5
Moreover, a public interest is at the root of even a strong model
of protecting assets by encouraging bargaining. Where the asset is
tangible, the model prevents physical battles over possession. After
all, one can assert exclusive dominion over tangible property.1
°6
With intangibles, such a rationale does not work. Many intangi-
bles' o7 have attributes of so-called "public goods"; that is, they
may be used simultaneously by several people and it is inefficient
to prevent people from doing so.' Thus, with both tangible and
intangible property rights, the principle of exclusivity is not a
product of the natural order. Rather it is the result of decisions
that society will benefit as a whole from the creation of property
rights.'0 9  Therefore, proponents of broad property rights in
publicity value should shoulder the burden of demonstrating that
the public is best served by the existence of such rights."0 In
"o, U.S. CONST. amend. V. This restriction originally applied only to the federal
government. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51
(1833) (holding Fifth Amendment prohibition on taking private property without compensa-
tion applies only to federal government). However, it has since been applied to the states.
See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-35 (1897) (prohibiting state
taking of private property without compensation using Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment).
106 Madow, Publicity Rights, supra note 18, at 148-51.
1 This does not mean that only one person can have an interest in any item of tangible
property at one time. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 1-2 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing various potential interests in "Blackacre").
" Some intangibles, like stock certificates, can be viewed as tangibles from the point of
view of protection rationales. A stock certificate can be used to represent only one ownership
interest at any one time.
,o
8 See, e.g., G. S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896,
900 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing public good externality of free-riders), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2927 (1993); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1025,24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same), modified, 35 F.3d 1435, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). However, the desire to encourage creation
of such intangibles may lead society to grant a degree of exclusive control over such
intangibles to one person.
'" This may overstate the rationale for property rights, especially in land. One might
argue, for instance, that property rights result from a property controlling elite with the
political or physical power to impose its desires to hold onto land on the legal system.
"o Cf MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.3 (indicating that proponents of broad rights place
burden on opponents to show why it should be limited).
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both copyright and patent law, Congress granted limited monopo-
lies over intangibles to encourage innovation. Without some
monopoly control by the creator, creativity could be stifled. On the
other hand, patents and copyrights are limited both in time and in
scope."' In contrast, publicity rights seem almost unlimited in
scope, particularly where the use is labeled "commercial,"" 2 and,
in many states, they are unlimited in time as well."'
Furthermore, the argument in favor of broad publicity rights
ignores a salient fact-other intellectual property rights do have
reasonably definable limits. Trademark law, by and large," 4 is
limited by the requirement that the mark owner show a likelihood
". E.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-07 (1988) (copyright scope); id. §§ 302-04 (1988) (copyright
duration); 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (patentable subject matter); id. §§ 154-
56 (amended 1995) (patent duration).
..
2 But see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 868 F. Supp. 1266
(N.D. Okla. 1994) (finding parody defense to right of publicity claim even when use is
deemed "commercial").
11 During the lifetime of the celebrity there is no time limit. States differ about the
extent to which the rights are descendible. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 9.5. See also Sheldon
W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of
Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1215-37 (1986) (discussing descendability of right of
publicity). California has a statute permitting inheritance of publicity rights, but limits the
time to 50 years after the celebrity's death. Cal. Civ. Code § 990(g) (West Supp. 1995).
114 I say it is "by and large" so limited because one aspect of trademark law is not so
limited-trademark "dilution." Trademark dilution is an action under state law, available
in about half of the states. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 25, statutory note at 275.
Prohibiting a mark's use on other (usually non-competing) goods and services is a protection
against the diminution of the selling power of the mark. Id. cmt. c at 278. Statutes
protecting trademarks against dilution do not require a showing of likelihood of confusion.
E.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 368-d (McKinney 1984); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330 (West
1987). Although dilution is potentially a very broad form of protection, its use has been
limited by two general requirements. First, one must have a famous mark. E.g., Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1049, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (2d
Cir. 1992) (refusing to protect "PM" following analgesic trade name). This would not be a
problem for a celebrity. Second, many courts require a showing of "likelihood of dilution."
E.g., W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co. 984 F.2d 567, 577, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1593 (2d Cir. 1993) (comparing lip balm sold under same name as deodorant); Mead Data
Cent. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 875 F.2d 1026, 1030, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (2d Cir. 1989)
(comparing LEXIS computer network to Lexus automobile); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of
Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232, 251, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (comparing Dom
Perignon champagne to Dom Popingnon popcorn sold in champagne bottle). What
constitutes "likelihood of dilution" is not well defined, however. Moreover, the lack of a
useful analytical structure in general for dilution cases, as well as a correlative lack of a
limiting principle, makes it subject to some of the same criticisms presented here. See
generally Welkowitz, supra note 90 (criticizing antidilution statutes).
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of consumer confusion between the owner's use and the use claimed
to be an infringement.115 Copyright law is limited by protecting
only an expression of an idea, not the idea itself1 6 and by the fair
use doctrine, which permits others to make use of the copyrighted
expression under certain circumstances." 7 Patent law is limited
by, among other things, a requirement that the invention be a
novel one"' and by the fact that patents last only twenty
years." 9 These limits exist for good reasons. The rights granted
through the legal system serve the public interest. Congress
limited those rights to insure that the public interest is not
overtaken by the private interests of intellectual property owners.
Thus, trademarks help consumers distinguish the goods and
services of various merchants. 2 ° Confusingly similar marks used
by others may distort the marketplace to the detriment of consum-
ers. Patents and copyrights promote invention and expression. On
the other hand, the limits imposed on these rights uphold the
public's interest in free competition, free expression of ideas, and
abhorrence of monopoly control. To give publicity rights greater
force than other intellectual property rights, one should put forth
a stronger justification than the "I have something that you want"
argument.
2. Content and Limits. A recent case, Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 2' is instructive in the search for
appropriate limits. Cardtoons denied a right of publicity claim
115 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a); see also, Eclipse Assocs. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d
1114, 1117-18, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining tests for likelihood of
confusion).
" 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports,
Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 68, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183 (2d Cir. 1994) (republishing portions of book
compiling automobile valuations), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 72 (1995); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919
F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (television show idea based on other script); Pamela
Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity
and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 881 (1983) [hereinafter Samuelson, Reviving
Zacchini].
... E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169-70, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1961 (1994) (musical group using song as parody); 17 U.S.C. § 107. See also
Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini, supra note 116, at 883-84.
' See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (describing requirements for patentability).
119 35 U.S.C. § 154.
120 Trademark dilution law also recognizes the reciprocal use of trademarks-as selling
devices benefitting businesses. See supra note 114 (discussing trademark dilution).
121 868 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla. 1994).
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based on the sale of parody baseball cards that used caricatures of
actual players with names like "Don Battingly" and "Treasury
Bonds."'22 Although the court found the cards to be clearly
commercial, it held that the players were not entitled to recover for
violation of their rights of publicity.'" The court employed a fair
use test drawn from copyright law to determine whether Cardtoons
and its cards deserved protection from liability.124
Cardtoons informs us that the right of publicity has limits, even
when the use of the celebrity image is labeled commercial.
Cardtoons also demonstrates the importance of context in determin-
ing those limits. In Cardtoons, the product itself was the source of
the problem-the celebrity image was the commercial product and
not merely a means to enhance the marketability of another
product. Thus, Cardtoons' parody cards represent the sale of an
expression of the celebrity identity. This use strongly resembles a
copyright situation, where the question is whether the allegedly
infringing use has copied the expression of the copyrighted work.
That a fair use defense seemed appropriate to the court is not
surprising.
Cardtoons is not unique in this regard. Many other right of
publicity cases present copyright-like situations.121 One example
is Zacchini.26 The local television station was not using Zacchini
as an advertising vehicle. Rather, it broadcast Zacchini's act (the
expression of his identity), thus depriving him of the value of the
expression he had created. By rejecting a First Amendment
defense, the Court, in effect, found no fair use of the expression.
Other right of publicity cases also emulate copyright, including
"poster" cases (defendant sells a poster containing the celebrity's
picture), 127 "t-shirt" cases (basically the same as poster cases),
2 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 838 F. Supp. 1501, 1512
nn.17 & 18 (N.D. Okla. 1993), vacated, 868 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla. 1994). For the
uninitiated, those names referred to Don Mattingly of the New York Yankees and Barry
Bonds of the San Francisco Giants. Id.
123 Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1268.
24 Id. at 1271-74.
125 See Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini, supra note 116, at 850.
' Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
127 E.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (2d Cir.
1981) (enjoining sale of Elvis Presley posters), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
[Vol. 3:67
24
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol3/iss1/3
1995] THE VANNA WHITE CASE 91
"game" cases, 128 celebrity impersonation cases 129 and "unautho-
rized biography" cases.
130
The copyright/publicity cases also help explain some of the
axioms of rights of publicity that can lead to misuse. One such
axiom is that right of publicity claims do not require showing
confusion or deception, just appropriation. 3 1 The copyright-like
cases do not require deception or confusion. This is logical because
the crux of the problem is the sale of the celebrity image, not its
use as an independent marketing device. Nevertheless, by using
limits appropriate to the kind of case, as in Cardtoons, reasonable
boundaries may be imposed.
Cases like White, on the other hand, do not fit the copyright
pattern. These cases involve using a celebrity image as part of an
advertising campaign. Particularly when such uses rely on the star
quality association with the celebrity image, such cases strongly
resemble trademark cases. These cases use the celebrity as a
marketing device, to enhance consumer recognition of an indepen-
dent product. This use is similar to the function of trademarks.
Thus, the tools and limits of trademark law can be helpful models
for these cases.
Indeed, the more expansive cases of celebrity rights in the
advertising context strongly resemble cases brought under trade-
mark dilution statutes. 132 An action under state law, trademark
" E.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (enjoining use of
baseball players' names on baseball table game); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d
458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (enjoining use of professional golfers' names).
' E.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 216 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 553 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding right of publicity not descendible under California law).
1 30 E.g., Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (involving play about
life of Janis Joplin). Sports games using celebrity names and statistics, such as Uhlaender
and Palmer, also fit the copyright model. The name ofthe celebrity is an integral part of the
product, rather than just a promotional vehicle.
1s1 As to intent, see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.6. As to confusion, see id, § 3.3[A][1],
[2].
132 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 46 cmt. c ("excessive commercial use ... may
dilute the value of the identity"). One such case is Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), a maker of portable toilets named its product "Here's
Johnny." Johnny Carson, then host of the Tonight Show, sued, claiming that the use of a
phrase associated with him and the Tonight Show (it was part of the introduction used by
Ed McMahon virtually every night-"Here's Johnny!") violated his right of publicity. See id.
at 832. A divided Sixth Circuit panel upheld this claim. It is unlikely that consumers were
confused either as to an endorsement of the product by Carson, or even by any implicit "star
25
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dilution protection is available by statute in about half the
states.' These laws exist to protect the mark against the
diminution of its selling power when it is used on other (usually
non-competing) goods. 34 Unlike traditional trademark laws,
statutes protecting trademarks from dilution do not require a
showing of likelihood of confusion.15  Nonconfusing uses of
famous trademarks that clearly are parodies have been enjoined
under this doctrine. 36  Even a form of commercial/non-commer-
cial distinction appears in such cases. 37  The analogous concern
in right of publicity cases would be overexposure, diluting the
possibilities for endorsements. 38
Recent dilution cases have suffered some of the same defects as
right of publicity cases. In both situations, the courts often focus
on the fact that the second user has conjured up the image of the
original in the mind of the viewer, as if that alone is sufficient to
create liability. Often these cases omit a careful analysis of the
harm, if any, that accompanies such associations. 139 This simplis-
tic analysis gives both owners of well-known marks and celebrities
quality association" as used in Midler or Waits. The court upheld a finding of no likelihood
of confusion in this case. Id. at 833-34. However, the court still found a violation of Carson's
right of publicity because the manufacturer had "appropriated [Carson's] identity for
commercial exploitation." Id. at 836.
" RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 25, statutory note at 275-76.
'
34 See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
24.13[11][b], at 24-107 (3d ed. 1994). For a discussion of dilution via competing goods, see id.
§ 24.13[2].13 5E.g., Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 624 & n.5, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
658 (2d Cir. 1983) (dicta) (suggesting damage is injury to trade name, not consumer
confusion); see supra note 114 (discussing trademark dilution).
" E.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding competitor's
use of mark in ad was likely to violate antidilution statute); see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1994) (parody of Michelob trademark held to be
both trademark infringement and violation of state dilution statute), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
903 (1995).
137 Deere, 41 F.3d at 44-45 (distinguishing uses denoted 'not for worthy purposes of
expression' and "simply to sell products" from those deserving protection).
' Cf Madow, Publicity Rights, supra note 18, at 221-22 (increased use of celebrity in
merchandising may increase sales of celebrity related goods; over-advertising, however, may
lead to lessened advertising value of celebrity).
'" In trademark dilution, the supposed harm is the whittling away of the marketing
power of the trademark. One could make a similar argument in favor of rights of publicity.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 46, cmt. c. For a critical evaluation of dilution, see generally
Welkowitz, supra note 90 (discussing trademark tarnishment).
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a great deal of control over the use of those marks or identities by
other people.14 On the other hand, important countervailing
concerns are surfacing in the dilution area.' Although courts
have yet to adopt this limitation, the recently promulgated
Restatement of Unfair Competition would limit dilution to situa-
tions in which the second (diluting) use is a trademark use.42
That is, in order for dilution to apply, the second user must be
using the mark as a trademark for its own goods, not merely as a
referent to the famous mark's owner or goods. An analogous limit
for publicity rights would be that the appropriator must be using
the celebrity's image not just to conjure up the celebrity to the
viewer, but to project a star quality association between the
celebrity and the advertised product. 4 3 Another limit imposed in
some dilution cases is a requirement that the owner of the famous
mark introduce some evidence that dilution has occurred or is likely
to occur.'44 Similarly, a celebrity could reasonably be required to
introduce evidence of dilution by overexposure in order to suc-
ceed.'4 5
140 For a recent example, see Deere, 41 F.3d at 45 (upholding preliminary injunction
against use of altered version of Deere mark used as parody in advertisement by competitor).
141 E.g., Welkowitz, supra note 90.
142 RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 25(2). Unfortunately, the courts have not heeded this
limitation, thereby creating some of the same problems associated with the right of publicity.
E.g., Deere, 41 F.3d at 39 (competitor using parody of Deere symbol in advertisement).
Notably, while the Restatement says that the reasons for protecting celebrity rights "are
generally less compelling than those that justify rights in trademarks," RESTATEMENT, supra
note 22, § 46, cmt. c, its authors make no attempt to limit the publicity right as they would
dilution.
1 One might also use a copyright analogy here to describe the use made by Samsung of
Vanna White's identity. One could view the role that she plays on television-the hostess
who turns the letters-as simply a fact. Samsung made use of that fact (and any
concomitant public perceptions about such a job) to create its parody. Thus, in copyright
terms, it made use of uncopyrightable features-a fact and, possibly, an idea-to create its
own work. Just as facts cannot be copyrighted, Vanna White should not be able to control
use of facts about her (or the fact that she is the Wheel of Fortune hostess) so easily. Cf.
Hoeling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681 (2d Cir.)
(holding one cannot claim copyright in historical facts), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
1" W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 577 (2d Cir. 1993);
Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Black Dog
Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 59, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (D. Mass. 1993).
" This assumes that there is no deceptive use of the celebrity, for which independent
recovery ought to be granted. Apparently, Vanna White did introduce some such evidence
at her trial regarding loss of potential electronic goods endorsements. See Rubin, supra note
27
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The point is that the appropriate analysis and source of limits in
right of publicity cases varies depending on context. The general
aphorisms about rights of publicity are inappropriate substitutes
for a sensitivity to the different situations in which right of
publicity claims arise. Whether one uses a copyright model or a
trademark model, finding some limits that account for the public
interest in using the celebrity image is essential. The limitations
imposed on rights of publicity need not be exact replicas of those
from trademark or copyright law. Trademark law concepts can be
adapted, however, to cases involving brand-like associations
without damaging the interests of the various parties, and copy-
right concepts may be used as models for appropriate limits in
cases involving copyright-like uses of celebrity images.'"
3. The Commercial Use Issue. As noted earlier, another problem
with White that is typical of many right of publicity cases is that
courts tend to view most commercial uses of rights of publicity as
unworthy of protection. We have already seen that commercial use
and use of commercial value may not be the same thing. In
addition, the preceding discussion illustrates that attaching near
fatal status to the sobriquet commercial use is inappropriate. In
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.47 (on which the Cardtoons
decision relied), the Supreme Court unanimously held that
commercial use did not presumptively mean that a parody was not
entitled to the fair use defense under copyright law. 4 ' Commer-
cial use is simply one factor in the analysis. 49 Although the
Court distinguished its "parody as product" situation from a parody
contained in an advertisement, 5 ° it did not state that advertising
should be a presumptively wrongful use. The Court simply said it
3, at 10F. Any such losses, however, would appear to be more a result of the critical nature
of the parody than a result of overexposure.
14 Naturally, there will be some line drawing issues. Some cases may not fall easily into
one category or the other. Consider, for example, a restaurant that serves food named after
celebrities (the Vanna White omelet?). On the one hand, the celebrity is not the product in
any direct sense. However, the celebrity's star quality is not really a marketing tool, either.
Because the celebrity name is used as the name of the product, rather than to associate it
with a unique source, this example most likely fits the copyright model.
147 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
1
'
4 Id. at 1173-74.
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would be "less indulgent" of such uses.'51 This observation
suggests that the mere invocation of commerciality, or even
advertising, should not substitute for a careful examination of other
factors that might validate the commercial use of a celebrity's
identity. As the dissent in White noted, the Supreme Court may
give lesser protection to commercial speech, but it does not leave
such speech unprotected.'52 In particular, where the use is not
an associational or star quality use, courts should consider whether
the celebrity should be rewarded for a suit motivated more by pique
than by lost commercial opportunity.
B. AN END RUN AROUND DEFAMATION?
Finally, in its haste to grant Ms. White a claim for misuse of her
identity, the Ninth Circuit overlooked a subtle but troubling
undercurrent in the case. This undercurrent is its departure from
the distinction between a commercial right of publicity and a right
of privacy grounded in a dignity interest. Though the right of
publicity traces its origins from the right of privacy, the theory of
publicity rights evolved rather distinctly from the motivations of
rights of privacy. The seminal Haelan decision distinguished the
dignity interest of rights of privacy from the commercial interest of
the right of publicity.'53 As the court noted, "it is common knowl-
edge that many prominent persons ... far from having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances [etc.]"" Thus,
the classic publicity right is, in essence, the right to recover the fee
lost when the defendant used the celebrity's name, likeness, etc.
without permission to promote defendant's products. Although
implicit in this claim may be an understanding that the celebrity
has a right to pick and choose among available offers (or to refuse
them all), it is the appropriation, not any perceived insult, that
151 Id.
1.2 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
" Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
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underlies the right. 5 6
However, in White, one gets the distinct feeling that what
motivated the suit was not the commercial aspect of the advertise-
ment, but the comment it made about Vanna White-that a robot
could do her job equally well. Thus viewed, the suit is less about
commercial misappropriation, as in International News Service v.
Associated Press,'56 than about a kind of defamation. If so, then,
as with defamation, appropriate accommodation should be made for
competing values.
White is not unique in this regard. Other cases involving
celebrity rights also have appeared to be more like defamation
cases than intellectual property cases. Another example is the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc."' Tom Waits
evidently was upset at the imitation of his voice primarily because
he adamantly refused to endorse products. Thus, the commercial
made him look like a hypocrite.'58 Discussing the compensatory
damage award to Waits of $375,000,'r9 the court expressly held
that right of publicity claimants can recover for "humiliation,
embarrassment, and mental distress.""6 These are not measures
of commercial detriment, but are measures of loss of dignity, such
as that associated with defamation.
Still another example is Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for
Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 161 where
the defendant marketed busts of the late Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. without permission. The Georgia Supreme Court, 162 respond-
ing to certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, acknowledged the distinction between rights of publicity
and rights of privacy and the differing measures of damages for
"
5 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 1-6, 1-7 (calling rights of publicity property
rights, possibly grounded in misappropriation and distinct from privacy).
'56 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
157 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
'58 Id. at 1103.
'
59 Id. at 1102-03. Waits also was awarded $2 million in punitive damages. Id. at 1104.
160 Id. at 1103 (quoting Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824
& n.11 (9th Cir. 1974)).
161 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
62 The Georgia Supreme Court's answers to the questions can be found in Martin Luther
King Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 216
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 711 (Ga. 1982).
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each claim.16 3 The court also indicated that commercial exploita-
tion of one's name or likeness "for advertising purposes [invokes]
not the slightest semblance of an expression of an idea, a thought,
or an opinion [protected by the First Amendment]."' 14 Thus, the
court did not see a conflict with the law of defamation. Neverthe-
less, overtones of defamation are in the motivations described for
the suit: "Here [the plaintiffs] seek to prevent the exploitation of
[Dr. King's] likeness in a manner they consider unflattering and
unfitting. "'66
In essence, many right of publicity suits resemble claims for
intentional (or perhaps negligent) infliction of emotional distress.
When such damages are recoverable in a right of publicity case,
however, the courts effectively are bypassing the limitations on
defamation of public figures created by New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan'66 and its progeny.
The Supreme Court indirectly addressed this issue in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.167  There, the Court distin-
guished a right of publicity claim (such as Zacchini's) from the
claims in defamation and "false light" tort cases, 68 thus indicat-
ing it believed the defamation analysis to be inapplicable. Howev-
er, the context of Zacchini was vastly different from White. In
Zacchini, the Court specifically distinguished Zacchini's situation
from that of an unauthorized use of a celebrity in an advertise-
ment, calling Zacchini's case the "strongest case for a 'right of
16 Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc.,
694 F.2d 674, 680 (11th Cir. 1983) ("the measure of damages to a public figure for violation
of his or her right of publicity is the value of the appropriation to the user").
164 Id. at 677 (quoting Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905)).
This quotation also shows that the court did not distinguish an "advertising" use from one
in which the celebrity was the product. The sale of Martin Luther King, Jr. busts appears
to be a copyright-like issue more than an advertising issue (although the advertising for the
busts may have been offensive as well).
"' Id. at 683. In a concurring opinion, Justice Weltner cautioned that the right of
publicity enunciated by the majority carried the potential for infringing free speech. Id. at
685-86 (Weltner, J., concurring). He pointed out that a "commercial" use of one's name or
likeness did not remove the portrayal from the protection of free expression. Id. at 686. He
concurred with the majority's result on the grounds that in this case the defendant's actions
were unconscionable and called for a remedy-which he pointedly refused to call a right of
publicity. Id. at 684-85.
1'6 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
167 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
'6' Id. at 573-74.
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publicity.' "169 The reason for the distinction was that Zacchini's
very livelihood was at stake after a news program showed his
"entire act."70 Moreover, in Zacchini, the plaintiff sought to
recover essentially the fair market value of the appropriated
performance. His concern was purely economic-that the broadcast
had taken the value of his performance. In White, Vanna White
seems to have been concerned with protecting her reputation, as
much as complaining of a misappropriation.
Rather than looking to Zacchini as a paradigm, one might look
to Hustler Magazine v. Falwell' for a more analogous situation
to White. In Falwell, the Supreme Court held that the New York
Times standard applied to the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress when the plaintiff is a public figure.'72 Though
there are differences between White and Falwell,173 there are
notable similarities as well. Both cases used parody to make fun
of a famous personality. Both used the parody to communicate to
the audience-one to suggest that Rev. Jerry Falwell was not as
moral as his public image, the other to say that Vanna White's job
could be done by a robot in the future. No doubt both were
offended by the parodies and both sought damages for that offense.
The most significant difference is that the Vanna White parody was
in an actual advertisement. Yet, the ad still communicated an idea
over and above that ascribed to it by the court-selling Samsung
VCRs. The communication of ideas is at the heart of the First
Amendment's limitation on state tort law.
174
The danger presented by cases like White, Waits and Martin
Luther King is that celebrities are able to use the right of publicity
claim as a substitute for a defamation claim without being subject
to the public interest limits imposed on defamation actions.
1
69 Id. at 576.170 Id. at 575.
171 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
172 Id. at 56.
173 For one, Falwell did not involve an actual advertisement, just a parody of an
advertisement.
174 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977)
(noting copyright laws have been upheld in face of First Amendment challenges because
copyright laws do not restrain dissemination of ideas).
[Vol. 3:67
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Damages for humiliation 75 are not the same as lost wages or
opportunities that ostensibly motivate the celebrity activity and
provide a public interest component to a right of publicity
claim. 76  Before awarding damages for injury to reputation,
courts should demand that a public interest component be consid-
ered, 7 7 just as is done with defamation and other reputational
injury tort claims.
The most likely counter argument would employ the commer-
cial/non-commercial speech distinction to escape the necessity of
closely examining the public interest. In White, for example, the
court dismissed a First Amendment defense in this manner. 78
The commercial speech argument in a defamation context can be
summarized as follows. New York Times intended to insure a
robust debate on public issues and about public figures by insulat-
ing merely negligent conduct of certain defendants from liability.
Commercial speech, as the Court has instructed us, needs less
protection because it is less likely to be deterred by the threat of
liability for false or misleading publication. 79  One might con-
clude, therefore, that commercial speech-such as the advertise-
ment at issue in White-does not require the extra protection
granted by New York Times.
This argument, however, would miss the point. Samsung might
not be deterred from advertising by the threat of liability for
misappropriating someone's identity. But it would be deterred
from presenting a parody of a famous person as part of that
advertising. And therein lies the critical issue: do we, as a society,
wish to deter the parodies and social commentaries contained
within commercial advertising? I think not. Moreover, whatever
humiliation celebrities feel from such commentaries (in the absence
of a false implicit endorsement) is no greater than-and often less
17 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102-06 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993) (upholding both punitive and compensatory damages for humiliation).
176 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (false light claims focus on injury to reputation while
right of publicity claims promote celebrity activity).
... Published articles indicated that many comedians were concerned about the effect of
White on their ability to imitate or parody celebrities as part of their acts. E.g., Braxton,
supra note 3, at F2.
178 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).




Welkowitz: Catching Smoke, Nailing JELL-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case an
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1995
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
than-the humiliation permitted by New York Times in the
defamation context. Thus, the invocation of commerciality should
not substitute for a careful analysis of the real issues. Otherwise,
celebrities may be receiving undeserved protection from otherwise
protected commentary relating to them and to other social issues.
The "Vanna White" advertisement used by Samsung, for example,
could be seen as a commentary on the incongruity of one who
acquires fame and fortune by acting as a letter turner. The
commentary may not be on the level of a political cartoon, but for
us, or for judges, to attempt to measure the "worthiness" of such
commentary may be unwise.8 0
CONCLUSION
In sum, courts have treated rights of publicity as property rights
of a higher order than other forms of intellectual property. By
doing so, they lose sight of the central wrong at issue. Both
trademark-like and copyright-like right of publicity cases share an
important trait: the wrong at issue is a misappropriation. Too
often, courts focus on the appropriation and overlook the require-
ment that it be wrongful. At a minimum, to be wrongful, the
appropriation must take something that the supposed owner has a
need to control. A comparison of Zacchini, Cardtoons, and White is
instructive here. In Zacchini, the most compelling reason to grant
relief was that the broadcast of his act deprived Zacchini of his
livelihood.' By contrast, in Cardtoons, the parody baseball
cards did not deprive the ballplayers of their ability to pursue their
livelihood, either as baseball players or as celebrities. In addition,
the cards did not truly borrow the star quality of the players-they
1"0 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1173 (1994) (stating judges
should not assess quality of commentary).
's Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977). It is
instructive to compare Zacchini to the classic misappropriation case, International News
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). One of the problems presented in the latter
was that International News Service's appropriation of Associated Press's (uncopyrighted)
stories threatened the viability of Associated Press's news gathering ability. See id. at 239-
40. Thus, as with Zacchini, there was a demonstrable need to allow one side to control
information otherwise within the public domain. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
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merely poked fun at the players' public image. In White, however,
the court focused on the appropriation, without any meaningful
analysis of what made it wrongful. In essence, Samsung's free ride
for commercial gain on some aspect of Vanna White's fame made
its actions wrongful. But, as the Supreme Court noted in Acuff-
Rose, free-riding is not per se a bad thing.182
In advertising cases such as White, the core interest should be
protection against the use of the star quality as a sales vehicle.
The farther one gets from the core protection, the more indulgent
the court should be of the use. To the extent that the parody does
not simply borrow the star quality of the celebrity as a sales
vehicle, there should be a presumption of legitimacy to that
use."s  Where the use is a parody, that factor should weigh
against finding a misappropriation. A parody is an expression
independent of the celebrity image. In short, a much more
searching inquiry of the nature of the use is required than most
courts have been willing to give. Trying to make sense of the
current state of the law must often feel like catching smoke or
nailing JELL-O' 4 to a wall.
12 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994) (discussing
"transformative" works).
"' The White court's example of the Michael Jordan robot might be an example of using
a parody as a sales vehicle.
184 JELL-O is a registered trademark of Kraft General Foods, Inc.
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